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INTRODUCTION 
he Future of Access to Justice” is an ambitious theme for a 
symposium, and I can think of few higher compliments to 
Professor Arthur Miller than to say that he spent his career in the 
steadfast pursuit of it.  However, as I sat down to collect my thoughts 
for this Article, I found myself troubled by some treatment of this 
topic in the legal academy,1 in the popular press,2 and even in the 
 
∗ United States Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; A.B., St. 
John’s University, 1957; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1963; LL.M., University of Virginia, 
1992.  The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
my colleagues or of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  I would also like to 
acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of Lanora C. Pettit, my law clerk, in preparing 
this Article. 
1 See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, The Roberts Court and Access to Justice, 59 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 821 (2009). 
2 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Democrats Seek Papers to Define Whys of Roberts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at A1; see also Kenneth Jost, Roberts Court Closing Courthouse 
Doors for Many, JOST ON JUSTICE: LAW & JUSTICE BLOG (Aug. 15, 2011, 8:40 AM), 
http://jostonjustice.blogspot.com/2011/08/roberts-court-closing-courthouse-doors.html. 
“T 
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Congressional Reports.3  All too often, this phrase—what is or should 
be the highest aspiration of our profession—is taken to mean little 
more than the ability not just to sue for any perceived slight in the 
federal courts, but to take that suit all the way to trial.4  Any decision 
by the Supreme Court of the United States, no matter how firmly 
rooted in the Constitution or in the will of Congress, that is perceived 
to stand in the way of this goal is decried as “rationing justice” or 
pursuing a nefarious political agenda.5  Because such a view 
misunderstands both the constitutional role of and the objective 
realities faced by the federal courts, I write to express why we must 
reexamine what is necessary to promote true access to justice in the 
federal courts. 
I 
DEFINING “ACCESS TO JUSTICE” 
First, how to define “Access to Justice.”  For example, look at the 
aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly6 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.7  In each of these cases, the Court 
was called upon to decide what was meant by the requirement under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that a plaintiff make “a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”8  Examining the entitlement language as well as past practice, 
the Court concluded that while a plaintiff need not show a 
“probability” of success on the merits, he did need to plead sufficient 
facts to raise “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.”9  On its face, a statement by the Supreme Court that a 
plaintiff needs to make “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” in order to haul that defendant 
through the federal court system hardly seems worthy of much 
 
3 Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
(2009) [hereinafter Iqbal Hearing]. 
4 Id. at 4 (statement of Henry J. Johnson, Jr., Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties). 
5 See Jost, supra note 2.  But see Jonathan H. Adler, Standing Still in the Roberts Court, 
59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1061 (2009) (concluding that in the first few years of the 
Roberts Court, it had not tightened considerations of standing). 
6 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
7 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
9 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
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attention.10  Most decisions interpreting the Federal Rules go largely 
unnoticed, even when they deal with pleading standards.11  And I 
would venture to guess that if we were to ask most Americans, they 
would expect that in order to put them through the expense and 
trouble that is modern discovery, a prospective plaintiff would need 
considerably more than that.  Indeed, Iqbal’s own attorney described 
the Court’s decision as “a detour rather than a roadblock” by “‘telling 
us . . . that we need to put a little more meat on the bones of our 
complaint.’”12 
Yet Twomby and Iqbal ignited a firestorm that within months 
reached all the way to Congress, the entity with ultimate, if rarely 
used, authority over the Federal Rules.13  Many, it seemed, felt that 
justice required the 1957 pleading standard that the Supreme Court 
announced in Conley v. Gibson, that is, “a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief.”14  So Senator Arlen Specter (D-
PA) proposed a bill that would overturn the Supreme Court and 
permanently adopt just such a standard.15  Hearings were held, and 
for a rather arcane topic, rhetoric on both sides grew heated.  Those in 
favor accused the Supreme Court of judicial activism designed to 
“implement this conservative Court’s apparent agenda to deny access 
to the courts to people victimized by corporate or government 
misconduct.”16  Those opposed asserted that “Iqbal’s pleadings were 
simply so conclusory in nature and so lacking in any specific 
allegations that to have allowed the case to proceed would have been 
a travesty of justice.”17 
Ultimately, the bill stalled in the face of more pressing issues, but I 
must confess that I find all of this furor to be somewhat perplexing.  
 
10 Id. 
11 After all, how many people remember Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011), a 
case decided just last Term that also interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)? 
12 Adam Liptak, Justices Turn Back Ex-Detainee’s Suit Against 2 Officials, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 19, 2009, at A16. 
13 The Supreme Court has authority to proscribe rules of procedure for the federal 
courts specifically because Congress allowed it, and Congress may override any proposed 
rule.  28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2074 (2006). 
14 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
15 Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). 
16 Iqbal Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties). 
17 Id. at 3 (statement of F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Member, H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties). 
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First, I remind those who believe that these decisions shut off all 
access to pursue one’s grievances that they are interpretations of a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.  Their only impact is on the federal 
courts, and as I will discuss below, there are numerous routes that an 
aggrieved party may pursue. 
Second, while I am sure that Twombly and Iqbal affected cases at 
the margin, I seriously doubt that the opinions worked, or even could 
have worked, a fundamental change in federal litigation.  After all, the 
Court’s previous pronouncement of the pleading standard in Conley 
was never taken to mean what it actually said.  Rule 12(b)(6) would 
have been a dead letter for half a century if a motion to dismiss could 
be granted only if it “appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to 
relief.”18  As numerous Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss were in fact 
granted between 1957 and 2009, that was clearly not the case.  
According to one recent study, in the two years before Twombly was 
decided, forty-six percent of all motions to dismiss that were filed, 
were granted. 19  And, according to the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, while there has been a slight uptick in the number of 
motions to dismiss filed in the years since Iqbal, there has been no 
increase in the percentage of cases that were terminated by the grant 
of such a motion.20 
Most fundamentally, I find the theory and the rhetoric in this 
debate to take a distressingly narrow and results-oriented view of 
what “justice” requires.  Indeed, one of the single biggest deficiencies 
that I see with current discussions on “access to justice” is that 
commentators throw around emotive terms like “rationing” without 
 
18 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (emphasis added). 
19 Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010).  The time period may skew this metric 
because by that time, as Professor Miller has argued, courts were already employing a 
number of procedural mechanisms in order to dispose of cases more expeditiously.  See 
Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1003–16 (2003).  However, it does mean that 
Conley had been severely eroded by the time that the Supreme Court decided Twombly 
and Iqbal. 
20 JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES vii (2011); see Hatamyar, supra note 19, at 599–600; see 
also Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Conceptual Challenges in 
and Empirical Results for Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to 
Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1957363 (summarizing competing views on the impact of Iqbal). 
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ever stopping to examine what they mean by “justice.”21  This is 
particularly striking given that a lawyer’s craft is so predicated on the 
precise use of language that the Supreme Court has had to determine 
such weighty issues as whether a tomato is a “fruit” or a 
“vegetable,”22 and to define terms as simple as the word “any.”23  Yet 
many seem to assume that “access to justice” is self-explanatory and 
that it means encouraging any individual who perceives himself as 
aggrieved to present his or her case first to a federal judge and then to 
a jury of his or her peers.24 
At least, according to those favoring a bill to overturn Iqbal, 
“[a]ccess to the courts and the ability for claims to be heard by a 
judge or jury are fundamental to our system of justice.”25  Plaintiffs, 
they say, should have “the opportunity to present their case to [a] 
Federal judge even when they [do] not yet have [a] full set of facts.”26  
But because Iqbal is implicated only when a claim is facially 
implausible, we are not actually discussing the plaintiff who does “not 
yet have a full set of facts.”  Instead we are talking about whether a 
plaintiff should be allowed to force the defendant through the expense 
of discovery and potentially the risk of trial when they have no 
actionable facts at all. 
While I freely admit that defining justice is not an easy 
undertaking,27 I simply cannot subscribe to a view that so ignores the 
 
21 Cf. Stephen Reinhardt, Whose Federal Judiciary Is It Anyway?, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1 (1993).  The only exception that immediately comes to mind is almost twenty years old.  
See Austin Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice, and Court Reform: 
Examining the Critical Assumptions, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 319 (1985). 
22 Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893) (identifying the tomato as a vegetable). 
23 United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997); see also, e.g., Bailey v. United 
States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). 
24 Sarat, supra note 21, at 323–24 (listing the three main perceived barriers to justice as 
the “cost in money and time of litigation,” “the alleged inappropriateness of formal 
litigation’s adversarial process for a range of problems,” and “the ability and willingness 
of people to recognize that they possess a legally enforceable right”); see also Iqbal 
Hearing, supra note 3; cf. Miller, supra note 19. 
25 Iqbal Hearing, supra note 3, at 4 (statement of Henry C. Johnson, Jr., Member, H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties). 
26 Id. 
27 Indeed, that topic has troubled philosophers for millennia.  For just a few relatively 
recent examples, compare JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 16, 41 (1863) (defining 
justice as that which promotes maximum societal happiness), with JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (repudiating Mill and asserting that justice is equality and that 
inequality is just only if it makes the least fortunate better off), with ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 214 (1974) (noting that Rawls’s theory is internally 
inconsistent because “denigrating a person’s autonomy and prime responsibility for his 
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fundamental precept that “[j]ustice . . . is the tolerable 
accommodation of the conflicting interests of society.”28  I propose a 
different definition of justice, derived from the most fundamental 
aspects of the rule of law: access to a neutral arbiter who is both 
willing and able to decide like cases in a like manner based upon 
rules derived from a legitimate authority.29  Despite the furor that 
arose the last time a federal judge made a similar remark,30 I 
somehow suspect the first—the need for a neutral arbiter—is 
uncontroversial.  It is implications of the second—that the rules be 
derived from a legitimate authority—that is likely to upset many in 
this debate.31  For in a democracy such as ours, the legitimate 
authority does not lie with the attorney prosecuting, or the judge 
presiding over, any specific piece of institutional reform litigation.  It 
lies with the political branches, particularly with Congress and with 
the legislatures of individual states.32  Rather than the source of all 
law and all justice, “judges are citizens upon whom we delegate the 
responsibility of interpreting our laws and applying them to concrete 
 
actions is a risky line to take for a theory that otherwise wishes to buttress the dignity and 
self-respect of autonomous beings”). 
28 Philip Hamburger, The Great Judge, LIFE, Nov. 4, 1946, at 116, 122–25.  I applaud 
the proponent of the bill to overturn Iqbal, who at least recognized that justice has two 
sides, Iqbal Hearing, supra note 3, at 4 (“I believe that it is extremely important that a 
defendant be given wide latitude for pleading.”) (statement of Henry C. Johnson, Jr., 
Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and 
Civil Liberties), but given the implications of this bill I fear that it is merely lip service. 
29 Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 784, 
791 (1989); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93 (1986) (“Law insists that force not be 
used or withheld . . . except as licensed or required by individual rights and responsibilities 
flowing from past political decisions about when collective force is justified.”).  Under 
such a definition, Iqbal promotes justice if for no other reason than that it promotes 
candor, and through candor, consistency.  I find it somewhat surprising that there is 
apparently a debate in the academy regarding the value of candor in judicial decision 
making.  See Micah Schwartzman, Essay, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987 (2008).  I 
posit however that there can be little debate that if judges are candid, their decisions will 
be more consistent, or at least their inconsistencies will be more easily detected and 
corrected. 
30 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1 (1971). 
31 For example, Professor Dworkin, whose conception of the rule of law is generally 
accepted, has argued that judges ought to decide cases based upon their political 
convictions.  DWORKIN, supra note 29, at 225–75. 
32 Or it lies in constitutional amendment.  I would like to remind those who would 
assert that this is not a viable option that women gained the right to vote without filing a 
lawsuit.  As such, the question is why, if the majority of Americans are not willing to 
provide a particular federal right, it is legitimate for federal judges to overrule those wishes 
based on their own preferences.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1986). 
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disputes.  But if interpretation means whatever judges want it to 
mean, then the purpose behind this delegation of responsibility is 
defeated.”33  As such, I reject the notion proposed by many today that 
to promote access to justice, I must, or even should, promote my 
subjective view of what would be more “fair.”34  Instead, my duty in 
promoting true access to justice is to do everything within my power 
to enforce consistently the law as it is, not as I might wish it to be. 
I admit that this view is far from novel.  Indeed, Alexander 
Hamilton once said that “[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the 
courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict 
rules and precedents, which serve to define and point their duty in 
every particular case.”35  Nor is it free from manipulation for it 
requires a conception of which cases are truly “alike.”36  But as I 
describe more fully below, acting as such a neutral arbiter is precisely 
the role that federal courts were designed to play; and as they are 
currently arranged, it is at times more than they practically can 
manage. 
II 
A CONSTITUTIONAL QUANDARY: LIMITED JURISDICTION V. 
LIMITLESS EXPECTATIONS 
The federal courts simply were not constitutionally designed to 
shoulder the burdens now placed upon them.  That there would be 
some sort of federal judiciary was never a matter of serious debate 
because “[t]he mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of 
the national laws, decide[d] the question.”37  The precise sequence of 
events that led to the so-called “Madisonian Compromise” that is the 
current language of Article III has been the topic of much scholarly 
attention and is far beyond the scope of this Article.38  Suffice it to 
 
33 Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Judging and Democracy, 89 KY. L.J. 563, 566 (2001). 
34 See generally Nichol, supra note 1. 
35 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 430 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
36 By limiting it to “cases,” I recognize that this definition also creates something of a 
bias against those who do not or cannot sue, but that is an unavoidable consequence of 
Article III, section 2.  Cf. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598 
(2007) (“The federal courts are not empowered to seek out and strike down any 
governmental act that they deem to be repugnant to the Constitution.  Rather, federal 
courts sit ‘solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
37 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 35, at 435 (Alexander Hamilton). 
38 See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” 
Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J. 263, 293–317 (2007); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of 
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say that while there was considerable controversy over the extent of 
such judiciary’s jurisdiction, some points relevant to this debate are 
completely clear. 
First, the Framers did not deem the ability to present one’s 
grievances to a federal judge to be an absolute prerequisite to achieve 
justice.  While the Constitution places certain kinds of cases within 
the “judicial power of the United States,”39 it did not create courts 
with original jurisdiction to hear everyday suits by Americans.  The 
only federal tribunal mentioned in Article III is the Supreme Court, 
whose original jurisdiction was very limited.40  Indeed, the only way 
an American could bring suit in federal court in the very early days of 
the Republic was to sue a sovereign state or an ambassador.41 
Second, the federal courts were not empowered to take the sorts of 
steps that many commentators insist are necessary to promote equal 
access to justice, for example, recognizing a right to counsel in civil 
cases.42  Article I of the Constitution gives “All legislative Powers 
herein granted” to Congress.  While there may be debate at the 
margins about what constitutes a “legislative power,”43 it includes at 
least the power to “command[] the purse” and to “prescribe[] the rules 
by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.”44  
It was for this reason that Hamilton made that now famous statement 
that “the Judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the 
least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it 
will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.”45 
 
Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 757–96 (1983). 
39 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
40 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
41 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers 
and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction.  In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction.”). 
42 See Nichol, supra note 1; cf. Brennan Center, Civil Right to Counsel, 
http://brennancenter.org/content/section/category/civil_right_to_counsel (last accessed 
Mar. 7, 2012). 
43 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 751 (1986) (Stevens & Marshall, JJ., 
concurring) (“Under . . . the analysis adopted by the majority today, it would therefore 
appear that the function at issue is ‘executive’ if performed by the Comptroller General but 
‘legislative’ if performed by Congress.” (alluding to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126, 
137 (1976))). 
44 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 35, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton). 
45 Id. 
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Instead, the courts were designed to serve a far more limited 
purpose: maintaining a uniform interpretation of federal law.46  
Federal judges were provided with the minimum amount of authority 
deemed necessary to achieve that purpose.47  And still there were 
those who thought that federal judges were given too much power.  
For example, Brutus (likely Robert Yates) warned—quite presciently 
it seems—that the natural tendencies of those in office to be 
“tenacious of power” would “operate strongly upon the courts to give 
such a meaning to the constitution in all cases where it can possibly 
be done, as will enlarge the sphere of their own authority.”48  And far 
from creating the greatest possibility of justice, eighteenth-century 
defenders of the common man considered such an expansion likely to 
“absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several States; thereby 
rendering law as tedious, intricate and expensive, and justice as 
unattainable, by a great part of the community, as in England, and 
enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor.”49 
Such a skeptical view of the federal courts continued throughout 
the Founding period.  Indeed, the same fears drove the drafters of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 to include a relatively high amount in 
controversy requirement and to establish concurrent jurisdiction 
between the federal and the state courts over issues of federal law.50  
One of the reasons that the Democratic-Republicans so disliked the 
Judiciary Act of 1801 was that it extended the federal judiciary to 
“correct[] genuine defects in the organization of the federal judicial 
system which many responsible leaders had recognized for years,” 
specifically by providing access to the federal courts in the South and 
West.51  Again, rather than seeing this as promoting justice for private 
 
46 Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 35, at 435 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(stating that federal courts were necessary because “[t]hirteen independent courts of final 
jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, 
from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed”). 
47 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 35, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton). 
48 Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 
421 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
49 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 638 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter RECORDS]. 
50 See Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789: Political 
Compromise or Constitutional Interpretation?, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: 
ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 13 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992); see also Letter 
from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering, Dec. 22, 1814, in 3 RECORDS, supra note 
49, at 419, 420 (discussing the need for ambiguity in the language of Article III). 
51 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM, 1801–1805, at 113 
(1970); accord id. at 113–14; see also Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801). 
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citizens, the party of Thomas Jefferson “viewed the judges as . . . 
agents of tyranny”; it was the Federalists who “believed that the 
unpopularity of the judiciary was a sure sign that it was meritoriously 
performing its major function, checking the excesses of the 
populace.”52 
This state of affairs, both in terms of perception and structure, 
persisted at least through the Civil War,53 and probably considerably 
longer than that.  Even after the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court refused to assume for itself the role as “a 
perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights 
of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not 
approve as consistent with those rights.”54  As late as the 1940s, the 
Court routinely treated the States as the primary protector of the rights 
of their citizens, routinely refusing to enforce the Bill of Rights 
against the States.55  The one exception was the Court’s failed attempt 
to federalize certain economic rights under Lochner v. New York,56 
leading to a series of inconsistent cases that have been roundly 
condemned as inappropriate attempts to promote a particular social 
policy.57  The courts did not attempt again to step into the role of 
recognizing new rights, either statutory or constitutional, until the 
1960s. 
In the interim, there had been significant legislative steps toward 
federalization starting with Prohibition58 and the New Deal.59  
 
52 MALONE, supra note 51, at 114 (emphasis added). 
53 See, e.g., CARY FEDERMAN, THE BODY AND THE STATE: HABEAS CORPUS AND 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE ix (2006) (discussing the gradual expansion of federal habeas 
relief); PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 
236–37 (2000) (discussing the perception of federal courts after a number of pro-slavery 
decisions). 
54 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); see also ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE 
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876 154–55 (1985). 
55 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not apply the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination against the States); 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (double jeopardy); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 
U.S. 78 (1908); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (freedom of assembly).  
But see Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (takings 
clause). 
56 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
57 For a review of the evolving view of Lochner and its progeny, see generally Barry 
Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 881 (2005). 
58 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 55 
(1996). 
59 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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Congress, however, really energized federal litigation in the 1960s 
and 1970s.  As Professor Miller once commented, during this period, 
Congress “seemed to be operating a ‘new-right-of-the-month club.’    
. . .  The same societal forces that fueled the civil rights movement 
also impelled Congress to respond to other demands for justice, and 
new statutory rights of action became available in the environmental, 
consumer, political rights, and safety fields,”60 areas which previously 
had been considered the sole province of the police power of the 
States. 
These same societal forces also took hold of the courts as 
Americans (or at least American lawyers) began to develop the view 
that the federal courts were the first, last, and only bastions of justice.  
Seeing gaps in the enforcement scheme created by Congress or by the 
Constitution, lawyers would argue that the courts should step into the 
void.  And the courts readily complied.61  The Supreme Court also 
incorporated rights against the states that it had previously denied,62 
and invented a number of entirely new rights,63 all of which could be 
 
60 Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 
5–6 (1984) (“The sensitivity of courts in recent years . . . has generated a myriad of cases 
involving a kaleidoscopic range of matters that were not within the standard litigation 
repertoire twenty-five years ago—dress and hair codes, academic and government 
employment status, prisoners’ rights, and welfare benefits . . . . reflect[ing] the revolution 
in thinking about entitlements and private rights that raged in the courts and law reviews 
during the late 1960’s.”). 
61 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).  In a related phenomenon, 
even when the Court refused to find a cause of action in a particular federal statute, the 
Court would often allow enforcement (at least against certain public officials and entities) 
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See Wayne McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: 
Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part 1, 60 VA. L. REV. 
1 (1974) (describing how the number of § 1983 suits jumped from 300 in 1960 to 8000 in 
1972); see also Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 559–60 
(1981).  For a typical defense of this sort of judicial legislation, see Richard B. Stewart & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982). 
62 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (overturning Twining v. New Jersey, 211 
U.S. 78 (1908) and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), to enforce the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination against the States); see also Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)); 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), to 
incorporate the exclusionary rule against the States).  There had been certain moves 
toward incorporating the First Amendment against the States starting in the 1920s and 
1930s.  See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (enforcing the First 
Amendment against the States).  This move also continued in the 1960s, see Edwards v. 
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), as did the general move toward complete 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights, see, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
63 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965). 
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enforced in the courts either through habeas or through these newly 
discovered private rights of action.  Though all of this constituted 
blatant steps by the federal courts to expand their own jurisdiction, 
there was relatively little backlash, all because of the increasing 
number of adherents to the view that federal courts could, and indeed 
should, resolve a society’s ills. 
Though this development started with Congress, ultimately its 
effect on the democratically elected branches of the American system 
has been far from salutary.  In the 1780s, America’s political leaders 
were expected to determine for themselves the limits of their own 
power and to stay within them.64  But as early as the New Deal, when 
the Court showed itself more willing to overturn congressional 
legislation, the President was openly encouraging the Congress to 
abdicate that constitutional duty.65  And as the courts showed 
themselves more and more willing to legislate from the bench, 
Congress simply found “a way to legislate that pushes tough political 
problems onto [the courts].”66  This sort of “let the courts figure it 
out” attitude does not promote the sort of reasoned discussion and 
compromise we expect from our elected leaders.  Indeed, it 
encourages them to stand to the side so that they may praise any 
popular court ruling as “promoting justice” and criticize any 
unpopular one as “judicial activism.” 
As such, the impact on the courts was anything but salubrious.  The 
recognition of unenumerated rights not only caused criticism in 
 
64 This concept is almost entirely foreign to modern Americans, but it was an argument 
for why creating a judiciary that was perceived of as too powerful was unnecessary as well 
as dangerous.  Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 35, at 426–27 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (“If it be said that the Legislative body are themselves the Constitutional judges 
of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the 
other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where 
it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution.”).  And 
ultimately, it is an option that was foreclosed not by the language of the Constitution but 
by the Court’s decision in Marbury.  William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to 
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 22–27 (1969). 
65 Van Alstyne, supra note 64, at 19 (noting that the “tend[ency] to encourage 
congressional indifference of constitutionality . . . was utilized by President Roosevelt 
when he urged a House subcommittee chairman to resolve all constitutional doubts about a 
given bill in favor of the bill, ‘leaving to the courts, in an orderly fashion, the ultimate 
question of constitutionality’” (quoting 4 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 297–98 (1938))). 
66 John G. Kester, Are Lawyers Becoming Public Enemy Number One?, 
WASHINGTONIAN, Feb. 1984, at 114, 115. 
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certain quarters for overstepping judicial authority,67 it “encouraged 
the emergence of class actions based on conceptions of corporate 
democracy, consumer rights, competitive behavior, and 
environmental protection” that flooded the system with cases the 
courts were simply not designed to handle.68  For not only has it 
increased the number of cases in the system, “[t]he characteristic 
features of [this] public law model are very different from those of the 
traditional model.”69  The cases tend to involve large and ever-
shifting numbers of parties, and “the trial judge has increasingly 
become the creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief” 
that “require the judge’s continuing involvement”70 and that more 
closely resemble complicated series of administrative regulations than 
the injunctions of old.  Thus the federal judge became both the creator 
and the interpreter of any number of social policies, roles that the 
Founders explicitly gave to different bodies both for the protection of 
individual liberty and for concerns about institutional capacity.71 
Fortunately, in the last few years, an increasing number of lawyers 
and judges have acknowledged that so drastically departing from the 
scheme designed by the Framers was folly.  Legislation through 
litigation is not only expensive, it decreases the legitimacy of the final 
decision and might in some ways even be harmful to those individuals 
the litigation seeks to help.72  There are still those who believe that 
anything less than full access to the federal courts for the purposes of 
pursuing such an agenda is an attempt to ration justice.  But, as I will 
discuss in Part III, practicality also mandates that we cannot continue 
 
67 The most obvious example of this is the controversy surrounding Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973), that grew to such an extent that the majority opinion in Casey v. Planned 
Parenthood made the highly unusual, if not unprecedented, step of commenting on it.  505 
U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (noting the extent of the “national controversy” and stating that “to 
overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed 
decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question”); see also id. 
at 1000 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the political pressure was the Court’s own fault 
because so long as the “Justices were doing essentially lawyers’ work up here—reading 
text and discerning our society’s traditional understanding of that text—the public pretty 
much left us alone”). 
68 Miller, supra note 60, at 6. 
69 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1284 (1976). 
70 Id. 
71 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 35, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton). 
72 Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 
VA. L. REV. 7, 97–118 (1994) (announcing a theory that, at least in the short term, Brown 
v. Board of Education served to harden social repression in the South). 
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on the path started in the 1960s if we are going to promote justice 
through the consistent application of the rule of law in federal courts. 
III 
A PRACTICAL PROBLEM: LIMITED CAPACITY V. LIMITLESS 
LITIGATION 
Put simply, despite having the incentive and the tendency to punt 
difficult questions to the federal courts, Congress has not provided 
those tribunals with the resources to handle the load.  To be fair, as I 
will discuss below, I doubt simply throwing more resources at the 
courts would solve the problems they face today.  But the stark reality 
is that Congress has not undertaken a serious, systematic restructuring 
of the federal court system since the Industrial Revolution—before 
Prohibition, the rise of the Administrative State, and the era of 
implied rights of action.  The inevitable result has been the overtaxing 
of the system, and it is time to reconsider the assumption that more 
federal cases equates to more access to justice, more consistent 
application of federal law, or even better treatment in any given case. 
The structure of the federal courts has not changed much since 
shortly before the turn of the twentieth century.  For the first hundred 
years of the federal judiciary, there was no intermediate court of 
appeals.73  What were then known as circuit courts, which were 
composed of one district court judge and two Supreme Court Justices 
(later reduced to only one Justice), “had some appellate jurisdiction 
over the district courts, [but] they were mainly trial courts 
themselves.”74  The only true appellate court was thus the Supreme 
Court.  However, the Industrial Revolution, with its vast effects on the 
demography of our nation, made that system no longer workable, 
causing the Congress in 1891 to pass the Evarts Act and to create the 
three-tier judicial system with which we are now familiar.75  Since 
that time, the number of geographical circuits and the number of 
federal judgeships have increased, but the structure itself has 
remained relatively static.76  And for about half a century, the system 
worked quite well. 
 
73 See POSNER, supra note 58, at 4–5. 
74 Id. at 4; see also Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156 (1802); Judiciary Act of 
1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 4 (1789) (establishing that any two of these judges would constitute a 
quorum and providing that the district judge could not sit on appeal of his own case). 
75 Act of Mar. 3, 1981, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). 
76 POSNER, supra note 58, at 5–9; JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., 
2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
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Then came the Federalization Revolution of the 1960s, spawning a 
spike in caseloads in the federal courts that cannot be described as 
anything other than dramatic.  Between 1960 and 1983, the number of 
cases filed in the district courts increased by over 330%, and the 
number of appeals filed increased by 686%.77  Now, as Professor 
Miller once noted, “To the extent that the courts have leant a 
sympathetic ear to new theories of entitlement and liability and have 
been unwilling to terminate cases prior to trial, their bloated dockets 
represent[ed], in a sense, a self-inflicted wound.”78  Nonetheless, the 
cases were there, and the courts needed to address them somehow.  
As no one doubted either that this docket explosion had led to lengthy 
delays in the processing of individual cases—reviewing the old adage 
that justice delayed is all too often justice denied—the debate became 
how they should best proceed. 
There were those who felt that all that needed to be done was for 
the courts themselves to work harder and smarter than they had in the 
past.79  To a certain extent, I agree that that was at least a temporary 
solution to the docket problem.  In 1973, Chief Justice Burger noted 
that “we were still clinging far too much to practices, procedures, and 
attitudes that . . . were already obsolete at the beginning of this 
century.”80  And within a couple of years, numerous academics made 
suggestions on how the courts, particularly the court of appeals, could 
modernize.81  Many of those suggestions—for example, the increased 
use of a centralized staff—were quickly adopted. 
But the backlog continued to grow.  By the late 1980s or early 
1990s, we had “reached, [if not] passed, the point where the increase 
 
COURTS (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Annual 
Report/2010/images/annualReport2010.pdf.  This actually dramatically overstates the 
strength of the federal judiciary, which has had a chronic problem of understaffing for 
years.  See, e.g., JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY (2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2010 
year-endreport.pdf.  As a result, due to the number of vacancies, at the end of 2010, there 
were closer to eight hundred active judges, causing us to rely with increasing regularity on 
judges with Senior Status (a sort of semiretirement judges may take when the sum of their 
age and their years on the bench is eighty). 
77 POSNER, supra note 58, at 59. See generally David S. Clark, Adjudication to 
Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 
55 S. CALIF. L. REV. 65 (1981). 
78 Miller, supra note 60, at 6. 
79 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 19, at 987–95 (citing a study by the National Center for 
State Courts showing stable filings between 1985 and 2000). 
80 Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of Justice, in DELIVERY OF JUSTICE: 
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 84, 84 (1990). 
81 See, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 13–43 (1976). 
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in federal court cases pose[d] a serious and substantial risk to the 
nature and quality of the federal judicial system,”82 and therefore the 
justice it dispenses.  Yet the increase continued, particularly at the 
appellate level.  “A series of commissions, committees, study groups, 
conferences, and symposia predicted that the rapidly increasing 
number of cases was about to  overwhelm the federal appellate court 
system and that only radical structural reforms could save it.”83  Calls 
for reform came from all sides of the political spectrum.  Judge 
Stephen Reinhardt of my own circuit argued that it would be 
necessary to double the size of the courts of appeals just to keep up 
with the growth.84  Chief Justice Rehnquist warned that “[a]n era of 
austerity will require changes in the way the judiciary does its internal 
business.  It will also require changes in the habits and expectations of 
professional users of the system—lawyers and judges whose habits 
and expectations were developed when the system was under far less 
pressure.”85 
Still nothing changed, and twenty years later, the federal courts 
have survived.  The naysayers seem to have been proven correct.  
“[T]oday the courts of appeals are not hopelessly backlogged.  There 
is no panicky sense of being overwhelmed.  Everything seems to be 
‘business as usual,’ at least on the surface.”86  As a result, the concept 
of the “crisis of volume” has receded from the public consciousness.  
However, I suggest that the calm is really a chimera.  Rather than 
being able to assimilate those changes in caseload, just to keep their 
heads above water, the federal courts have been forced to rely 
increasingly on procedural mechanisms that were already raising 
 
82 John O. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve the 
Federal Judicial System, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 762–63 (1989). 
83 Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining the “Crisis of Volume,” 8 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 102 (2006). 
84 Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea to Save the Federal 
Courts, 79 A.B.A. J. 52, 53 (1993).  As was immediately recognized, and as I will discuss 
below, there are both practical and jurisprudential problems with such a proposal.  See 
Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice: The Case Against Expansion of the 
Federal Judiciary, 79 A.B.A. J. 70 (1993) (explaining that the creation of such jumbo 
courts would harm both the productivity of individual judges and the clarity and stability 
of the circuit’s law, creating incentives to litigate). 
85 William H. Rehnquist, 1993 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 17 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 571, 571 (1994). 
86 Baker, supra note 83, at 102. 
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concerns about their effects on the quality of federal justice as early as 
1973.87 
Though the legal “discipline [at least occasionally] recognizes that 
organizational structure and process may affect outcomes,”88 
relatively little attention has been paid to the structural changes made 
to courts such as mine over the last thirty years.  One notable 
exception is the increased use of unpublished opinions, which excited 
a great deal of interest among law professors.89  These dispositions 
are short, recite no facts, give very little analysis, and before Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 were often completely unciteable.  
That these were not considered precedent caused many to complain 
that we judges were shirking our responsibility and hiding our 
agendas behind a veil of unaccountability.90  Frankly, I do not find 
this criticism to be particularly persuasive.  As can easily be seen by 
the record of my own court, a judge who wishes to pursue his own 
agenda outside the bounds of congressional statute or the Constitution 
may and will do so regardless of whether his or her opinion is 
published.91  Indeed unpublished dispositions are a highly inefficient 
method of promoting such a personal agenda because while it may or 
may not allow a judge to pursue those goals in a particular case, it 
does not bind future panels as would a published decision.92 
What I consider to be the more important critique comes from the 
method in which the vast majority of these dispositions are created.  
As a relatively recent article has quite colorfully described, we have 
in a sense created “two separate and unequal tracks by which cases 
are considered and resolved in our federal appellate courts,”93 the 
 
87 Burger, supra note 80, at 87 (“With the enormous pressures on Courts of Appeals, 
there is risk that, in a screening process, some non-frivolous appeals having arguable merit 
may be denied oral argument . . . .”). 
88 See Robert A. Katzmann & Michael Tonry, The Crisis of Volume and Judicial 
Administration, in MANAGING APPEALS IN FEDERAL COURTS 1, 4 (Robert A. Katzmann & 
Michael Tonry eds., 1988). 
89 See generally Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm und 
Drang Over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (2005). 
90 Id. at 1468. 
91 For more information about the Ninth Circuit’s record of doing precisely that, see 
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A Decade of Reversals: The Ninth Circuit’s Record in the 
Supreme Court Since October Term 2000, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1557 (2010). 
92 An unpublished decision is perhaps less likely to attract attention from an en banc 
court, but if all unpublished dispositions were in fact published, there would be so many 
published opinions that it would be unlikely that any given one would be more likely to 
attract such attention. 
93 David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over 
Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1668 (2005). 
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“Learned Hand” track and the “black box” track.94  The “Learned 
Hand” track is the method traditionally associated with federal 
appellate courts: cases are assigned to three-judge panels, oral 
argument is held, and a well-reasoned opinion setting precedent for 
future cases is authored.95  But as currently constituted, it is simply 
unrealistic to expect such treatment for every case filed in the federal 
courts of appeals.  In the year ending June 30, 2011, about twelve 
thousand appeals were filed in the Ninth Circuit alone.96  Even if my 
circuit had its full complement of twenty-nine judges and even with 
almost as many senior judges, it is simply not possible for us to give 
such attention to every single one of those cases. 
As such, we are left with the “black box” method.  Indeed, as I 
have described in more detail elsewhere, by my count fewer than one-
sixth of the cases filed in the Ninth Circuit are decided in the 
“Learned Hand” track.97  Half are dismissed for some form of 
procedural default.98  About two-thirds of the remaining cases are 
assigned to an oral argument calendar, but anywhere from one-quarter 
to one-half of these cases still will not see oral argument because the 
panel may decide to submit the case on the briefs.99  The other third 
(about one-sixth of the total) are assigned to one of a number of 
“screening panels,” where three judges will spend on average less 
than ten minutes per case and are thus largely dependent on the 
representations of staff attorneys who prepare a proposed 
memorandum disposition in advance.  Though we retain the power to 
“kick” a case to an oral argument panel, in the first five months of 
2009, we agreed with the staff attorneys’ recommendations perhaps 
ninety-five percent of the time.100  A recent article published in the 
Duke Law Journal confirms that all other circuits have similar 
mechanisms.101  This includes the Second Circuit, which was the last 
 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 1668–69. 
96 See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, U.S. Court of Appeals—Judicial Case 
Load Profile (on file with author); DUFF, supra note 76, at tbl.B-1. 
97 Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s Bargain: The Federal Courts and 
Expanding Case Loads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 473, 
474–77 (2009). 
98 Id. at 476 (citing Ninth Circuit General Order 6.2(a) (2008), http://www.ca9.uscourts 
.gov/ rules/General Orders/General Orders.pdf). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case 
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315 (2011); see also David R. Stras & 
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to hold onto the notion that every litigant should receive oral 
argument, and the D.C. Circuit, which has the lowest caseload of any 
circuit in the country.102  The circuits vary as to the types of cases that 
are sent to such screening panels, but immigration cases are common 
to all of them.103  Other popular types of cases assigned to such 
panels are Social Security appeals, Anders brief appeals,104 and 
appeals that are submitted pro se.105  From personal experience, I can 
say that the Ninth Circuit practice is similar.106 
This method of handling cases can have negative implications on 
justice in several ways.  First, such cursory review can lead to 
mistakes simply because there is little time to review the work 
performed by the staff attorneys.  Second, though all cases are equally 
important to the individuals involved, we treat some cases as more 
procedurally equal than others.  Third, there is the potential for one 
badly chosen test case to create a bad rule that will be very difficult to 
correct.  Nominally speaking, cases are assigned to screening panels 
because the law is clear, requiring only its application to the facts.  In 
my circuit, this not uncommonly means that staff in San Francisco 
will identify one of any number of similar cases to receive full 
“Learned Hand” treatment and hold the others to be resolved on 
screening.  This creates considerable path dependence and puts 
considerable pressure on the selection of the proper case when there is 
very limited information.  If for whatever reason an error is not 
caught in that initial case, it is unlikely to be corrected for quite some 
period of time because a memorandum disposition based on a 
previously decided case is rarely reheard en banc.  And while the 
 
Shaun M. Pettigrew, The Rising Caseload in the Fourth Circuit: A Statistical and 
Institutional Analysis, 61 S.C. L. REV. 421 (2010). 
102 Compared to the approximately twelve thousand cases filed in the Ninth Circuit in 
the fiscal year 2010, fewer than twelve hundred were filed in the D.C. Circuit.  DUFF, 
supra note 76, at tbl.B-1.  The next-largest circuit, the First, received 1530 new filings, id., 
and it too requires a screening process, Levy, supra note 101, at 335. 
103 Levy, supra note 101, at 333–38. 
104 Appointed counsel who wish to avoid filing a frivolous appeal, file instead a brief, 
named after Anders v. California, “referring to anything in the record that might arguably 
support the appeal.”  386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
105 Levy, supra note 101, at 333–38. 
106 Though the Eleventh Circuit was not included in this study, its methods are likely 
quite similar given that it has made the conscious choice not to request additional judges 
despite having over eight hundred cases per active judge.  Arthur D. Hellman, Assessing 
Judgeship Needs in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Policy Choices and Process Concerns, 
5 J. APP. PRAC. AND PROCESS 239, 255 (2003) (questioning the appropriateness of such a 
decision given the impact beyond the judges themselves). 
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Supreme Court occasionally grants a writ of certiorari in these 
cases,107 it is even more rare. 
The reader may recognize these problems as part of the umbrella 
issue of agency costs and the practice of delegation.108  Indeed, there 
is a common critique among professors who examine modern 
appellate practices that the quality of appellate opinions has decreased 
because judges are unable to supervise all of our staff and that we 
spend more time managing our law clerks than crafting our 
opinions.109  The problems of delegation become particularly acute 
when judges “delegate [their en banc monitoring duties] to law clerks 
who have only cursory and incidental knowledge of the circuit’s 
law.”110  However, with so many cases, it would simply not be 
possible to function with a smaller staff without returning to the days 
when it took years to decide cases, which would similarly have an 
adverse impact on justice. 
And according to recent research, eliminating delegation would not 
necessarily lead to better-reasoned decisions due to a phenomenon 
known as decision fatigue.111  Basically, as individuals make a series 
of choices, they become more likely to rely on intuition, however 
faulty, because they lack the mental energy to overcome their initial 
intuitive reactions.112  First developed in the realm of marketing, this 
theory has recently been examined in the context of judicial decision 
making with troubling results.  In 2011, three professors looked at the 
decisions of a group of Israeli judges who were asked to make a series 
of parole decisions on a single day.113  Without attempting to 
determine if any given decision was “right,” but controlling for other 
factors ranging from the severity of the offense to the personal 
characteristics of the offender, the researchers concluded “that the 
likelihood of a favorable ruling is greater at the very beginning of the 
 
107 There have been several such grants in this Term, at least one of which involved a 
screening panel applying the clear law of the circuit.  Gutierrez v. Holder, 411 F. App’x 
121 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 71 (2011). 
108 POSNER, supra note 58, at 139–57; see also Nicolai J. Foss et al., The Theory of the 
Firm, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 631 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit 
De Geest eds., 2000) (discussing the issue of agency costs as applied to firms). 
109 See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and 
Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2007). 
110 Tjoflat, supra note 84, at 72. 
111 See, e.g., Anastasiya Pocheptsova et al., Deciding Without Resources: Resource 
Depletion and Choice in Context, 46 J. MARKETING RES. 344 (2009). 
112 Id. 
113 Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 6889 (2011). 
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work day or after a food break than later in the sequence of cases.”114  
That is, this study confirms what previous studies had suggested—
that as judges make more decisions in a row, they are more likely to 
be swayed by external referents such as the status quo.115  According 
to another study conducted on a different set of judges, this tendency 
is heightened when—as may often be the case in screening 
situations—the judge perceives the question before him or her as easy 
and not requiring much deliberation.116 
Though these studies do not specifically deal with the issue, I also 
suspect that this problem of decision fatigue is only further 
exacerbated by a judge’s other duties.  In addition to deciding cases, 
judges today take on roles “in an elaborate administrative structure 
within their individual courts, their judicial councils, and the 
committees of the United States Judicial Conference.”117  We are also 
tasked with monitoring cases in our own circuit to avoid intra-circuit 
discrepancies, those in other circuits to avoid inter-circuit conflict, 
and those in the Supreme Court to avoid ultra vires action.  As such, 
we are always making myriad decisions, depleting the mental 
resources necessary to override the intuitive reasoning that may lead 
us astray. 
As could probably be surmised from my brief description of the 
courts’ history above, with the exception of the Eleventh Circuit 
which has consciously chosen to stay small despite a ballooning 
docket,118 the nearly universal response to this dilemma has been to 
add more judges.119  While this option is certainly preferable to 
keeping the status quo, it is unlikely to be the solution to our problem 
of how to provide quality justice in all cases that come before us.  As 
a practical matter, such a step is unlikely to happen simply given the 
fiscal situation in which we find ourselves.  Ten years ago the 
estimated cost of the addition of a single federal judge was 
$1,000,000 per year, for life; it is undoubtedly higher now.120  From 
the time of the Founding, the cost of the federal court system has been 
 
114 Id. at 6890. 
115 Id. 
116 Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 10–13 (2007). 
117 Newman, supra note 82, at 766. 
118 Hellman, supra note 106, at 253; see Tjoflat, supra note 84. 
119 See Reinhardt, supra note 84. 
120 See Tjoflat, supra note 84. 
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a motivation to keep it relatively small,121 and I somehow doubt that 
the current Congress would be particularly keen on extending the 
federal judiciary for precisely that reason. 
As an attempt to promote true access to justice, it could even be 
counterproductive.  Although in this Article I have discussed the 
consistent application of federal law as one task, it does in fact have 
two parts.122  First, it naturally entails an error-correction function, 
which would be eased in the short term by the addition of more 
judgeships.  But in the long term, it would not because the increased 
number of judges would ultimately complicate the second task: 
consistently interpreting the law.123  Adding judgeships creates 
instability in the law for a number of reasons, not least of which is the 
obvious one that it increases the possible permutations for any given 
three-judge panel.124  It also decreases the collegiality of a court, a 
crucial aspect of promoting consistent and just outcomes through 
discussion and deliberation both on individual panels and among 
nonvoting members of the court.125  As it is, the Ninth Circuit is, 
regrettably, too large to have full court en banc rehearing and must 
make do with a limited en banc panel of eleven randomly selected 
judges, which still does little to create true clarity and stability in the 
law.126  As one of my colleagues on the Eleventh Circuit has 
convincingly argued, such a development will ultimately encourage 
more litigation, creating a never-ending cycle.127  This inability to 
promote stability in the law and therefore in individual expectations 
of the law is what I consider to be the greatest threat to true access to 
justice in the federal court system, not anything the Supreme Court 
has done over the last few Terms. 
 
121 Marcus & Wexler, supra note 50, at 19. 
122 Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Should the Ninth Circuit Be Saved, 15 J.L. & POL. 415, 
417–18 (1999). 
123 Id. 
124 Tjoflat, supra note 84. 
125 Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003); see also O’Scannlain, supra note 122, at 418 (“[C]onsistency of 
law in the appellate context requires an environment in which a reasonably small body of 
judges has the opportunity to sit frequently together, thereby enhancing the understanding 
of one another’s reasoning, decreasing the possibility of misinformation and 
misunderstandings, and increasing the tendency toward unanimous decisions.”). 
126 O’Scannlain, supra note 122, at 419; see also A Conversation with Judge Harry T. 
Edwards, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 65 (2004) (discussing how the size of the Ninth 
Circuit makes “a viable process for rehearing cases en banc . . . very difficult” and that the 
current system can skew the results of cases); Tjoflat, supra note 84. 
127 Tjoflat, supra note 84. 
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IV 
AN ONGOING DILEMMA: RECENT JURISPRUDENCE AND PROMOTING 
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 
Indeed when reexamined through the lens of the principles 
discussed in Part I, I would assert that all of those decisions that I 
have seen criticized in the media128 promote true access to justice 
through promoting consistent enforcement of federal law and through 
channeling disputes to the entity most capable of resolving them. 
First, consider the Court’s decision in Arizona Christian School 
Tuition Organization v. Winn, which dismissed for lack of standing a 
taxpayer’s challenge to a state tax credit for donations to support 
scholarships for private schools.129  Because the case sounded in the 
Establishment Clause, on its face, it seems to promote inconsistency.  
Under Flast v. Cohen, a taxpayer does have standing to challenge the 
expenditure of general treasury funds to support religious schools,130 
and as a matter of economic impact, tax credits and government 
spending are fundamentally equivalent.131  However, I suggest that 
Winn does promote consistency with the broader rule that taxpayers 
do not have a sufficiently particularized injury to challenge the 
manner in which the government spends his taxes or disposes of its 
property.132  That is, it is Flast that is an aberration.  By limiting it to 
its facts, the Court has promoted consistency with other areas of law 
and has channeled those who wish to change tax policy to the forum 
with the legitimate authority to do so—the legislature.133 
 
128 See, e.g., Jost, supra note 2. 
129 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
130 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
131 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447 (conceding as much but explaining the difference as a 
matter of constitutional theory); see also NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS (2010), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/events/Should 
-We-Put-the-Brakes-on-Tax-Breaks.cfm.  As such, the topic of standing did not even arise 
in the Ninth Circuit’s considerations of the case.  See generally Winn v. Ariz. Christian 
Sch. Tuition Org., 586 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying rehearing en banc based solely 
on the merits of the case). 
132 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188–89 (1974); see Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); see also Hein v. Freedom From 
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599 (2007); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. 
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982); Doremus v. Bd. 
of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952); cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 
447, 488 (1923) (requiring the allegation to be that Congress violated a practically 
nonexistent limit on its power to tax and spend). 
133 Someday I hope that the Court will also choose to promote candor and end this 
endless litigation by simply overturning as has been advocated by certain Justices.  See 
Hein, 551 U.S. at 618 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring). 
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Next, consider Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, where the Court 
reminded plaintiffs that they cannot include individuals in their 
proposed class action unless they could affirmatively show that they 
shared a common injury.134  The channeling effect in that case is not 
immediately obvious because the Court did not actually disallow 
anyone from suing; the Court merely stated that being female and 
working for Wal-Mart does not establish sufficient commonality to 
allow one to bring a class action.135  However, allowing certification 
based upon the sort of statistical evidence presented in that case 
would have exacerbated the problems I discussed above, whereby 
people seeking change do so through the courts rather than Congress 
or through an administrative agency.  Furthermore, recall that class 
actions are themselves an oddity of our system whereby certain 
plaintiffs are allowed to do what otherwise they are forbidden, namely 
to sue to enforce the rights of others.136  As such, it is perfectly 
consistent with the complicated rules for institutional standing for the 
Court narrowly to construe the plaintiffs’ rights to do so.137 
A more obvious example of this channeling effect is J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, in which the Court held that a plaintiff 
who wishes to sue a British manufacturer for a defective product 
designed and produced in Britain, would have to do so in Britain, not 
in the state where the injury occurred.138  I understand that it is more 
convenient for the plaintiff to sue in his home state, which also 
provides substantive benefits over other fora (particularly, broader 
views of strict liability theory, punitive damages, and the American 
 
134 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011) (requiring either demonstration of a biased testing 
procedure for hiring or “significant proof that an employer operated under a general policy 
of discrimination”). 
135 Id. at 2557 (quoting Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissent from denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
136 Id. at 2550 (“The class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is 
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’” (quoting Califano v. 
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979))). 
137 See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the 
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 74 (2003) 
(“[I]t is important to keep in mind a central fact often ignored in modern procedural 
scholarship: the class action was never designed to serve as a free-standing legal device for 
the purpose of ‘doing justice,’ nor is it a mechanism intended to serve as a roving 
policeman of corporate misdeeds or as a mechanism by which to redistribute wealth.”). 
138 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).  This function is similarly served, albeit to a lesser extent in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011), when the 
Court held that if the plaintiff wished to sue an Ohio-based corporation for the design of a 
tire produced for foreign markets that caused an injury in a foreign country, he must do so 
either where the design was made or where the accident occurred. 
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rule whereby if he loses he will not be required to pay his opponents’ 
legal bills).139  But as defendants have precisely the opposite 
interests, we must find a tiebreaker unless we are going to adopt a 
view of justice that, once again, is entirely one-sided and results-
driven.  I agree with the Court that the tiebreaker is the due process 
concern involved with subjecting the defendant to suit in a distant 
forum which it has never entered.  But even for those more dubious of 
that position, from a societal standpoint, Britain is the better forum.  It 
is the location of the primary conduct—that is, the design and the 
manufacturing of the particular product—to be regulated.  It is also 
the location of the majority of the witnesses. 
Finally, consider AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, where the 
Court held that California law requiring any consumer arbitration 
clause to include a class-wide remedy was preempted by the Federal 
Arbitration Act.140  As the importance of alternative dispute 
resolution has been well known for quite some time, I will not belabor 
it here.  I note only that there are many circumstances in which 
avoiding the cost and stress of litigation has value not only to society 
but also to the parties who all too often have to continue to interact 
after the litigation is complete.141  Congress recognized this, and the 
consumer confirmed it by signing a contract with an arbitration 
clause.142  The Court’s decision, therefore promoted justice through 
the consistent application of federal law by enforcing that decision. 
 
139 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252–53 & nn.18–19 (1981); see also 
Leah B. Moon, Should They Stay or Should They Go: Applying the Forum Non 
Conveniens Doctrine to Foreign Plaintiffs Injured Abroad in Abad v. Bayer Corporation, 
5 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 1, 3 (2009). 
140 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (discussing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
141 Cf. Sarat, supra note 21, at 327.  As such, I am always heartened when I see 
programs that require mandatory arbitration because the likelihood is that not only will the 
courts be less burdened, but also the parties will more quickly be able to move on with 
their lives.  See Karen Engro, A Changing Paradigm: Mandatory ADR Has Dramatically 
Reduced the Pendency Time of Cases in the Western District of Pennsylvania, NAT’L L.J., 
Nov. 7, 2011, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202524627002&sl 
return=1.  Large businesses have already seen the value of this method of dispute 
resolution, to which one Justice has attributed the decrease in big civil cases.  Pamela A. 
MacLean, Justice Kennedy on Vanishing Big Civil Suits, TRIAL INSIDER (Apr. 16, 2011), 
http://www.trialinsider.com/?p=639. 
142 See, e.g., Jost, supra note 2 (“The decision in AT&T v. Concepcion gives businesses 
a roadmap to enforce arbitration clauses in preprinted consumer contracts that consign a 
defrauded customer to individual instead of classwide arbitration.”).  It is likely true that 
the Concepcions had very little bargaining power to alter the form contract they were 
signing, but they did have the option of not signing one at all, even if they wanted a cell 
phone.  See Press Release, TracFone Takes Three of the Five Top Consumer Report 
Magazine Slots for No-Contract Cell Phone Service (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www 
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If the concern among commentators is that no one will bring a 
lawsuit over a claim for the $30.22 that the Concepcions were 
charged in sales tax on a nominally free phone,143 then perhaps such a 
claim should not be brought.  Litigation is a deadweight loss to 
society, and there are other ways to dissuade companies from 
engaging in repeated, albeit relatively minor, bad behavior.  In 
particular, numerous administrative agencies are charged with 
enforcing extensive regulations that cover much of this conduct.  
Their expertise on a given topic allows them to review claims more 
effectively than any judge, no matter how diligent and hardworking.  
Of course, there are many instances when even after an administrative 
agency makes a decision, the litigant is still entitled to seek relief in 
court.  Since the 1970s, there has even been a presumption, which 
was created by courts and which by judicial fiat has become almost 
irrebuttable, that there will be such review.144  But query if such a 
presumption, at least as currently applied, is necessary.145  It can also 
be quite harmful to the courts.  As a result of very deferential 
standards of review,146 the agency’s decision will quite often be 
upheld, meaning that by applying an unwavering view that any 
agency decision must be reviewable in the federal courts, the 
workload of those courts is increased exponentially without adding 
much to the protection of the individual whose case is being 
reviewed. 
As such, I would take a more narrow view of this presumption and 
recognize that Congress is constitutionally empowered to determine 
the extent of our review.  If Congress concludes that it is necessary to 
preserve at least some judicial review of agency decisions, it can craft 
rules impossible to create by judicial fiat that pursue this goal without 
overburdening the federal courts.  For example, Congress can create a 
certiorari system, whereby the courts of appeals have discretion to 
 
.prnewswire.com/news-releases/tracfone-takes-three-of-the-five-top-consumer-report        
-magazine-slots-for-no-contract-cell-phone-service-135659323.html. 
143 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
144 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); see 
also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
145 Members of my own court have used this presumption, or at least something like it, 
on numerous occasions to preserve their own jurisdiction over issues Congress has 
repeatedly sought to put beyond their purview.  See, e.g., Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 
646 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (defining an issue to be a question of law in order to 
preserve jurisdiction). 
146 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(4)(B) (2006) (stating that in immigration law, “the 
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary” (emphasis added)). 
O’SCANNLAIN 3/19/2012  8:18 AM 
2012] Access to Justice Within the Federal Courts—A Ninth Circuit Perspective 1059 
determine which agency decisions require further review.147  Such a 
move would be particularly appropriate when the agency below has 
multiple layers of review, and I posit that it would not vary greatly 
from the screening system that we currently have.  As it is, we choose 
which cases merit our greater attention, largely delegating the task of 
disposing of other cases along the same lines.148  Adopting such a 
proposal would preserve the judicial review deemed necessary to 
keep agencies in line while promoting candor in the administration of 
the appeals process and ultimately justice through consistent 
application of federal law. 
Needless to say, neither arbitration nor administrative action is a 
panacea for the problems of the federal courts.  There are limits to 
what agencies may constitutionally decide, and unfortunately, the 
notion that justice is tied to the ability to sue is unlikely to leave the 
American psyche anytime soon.149  This leaves us in a quandary: 
whether as a matter of ideological preference or practical necessity, 
we must recognize that federal courts cannot perform all of the roles 
currently expected of them.  Therefore, as members of the legal 
profession, it is our responsibility to understand the limits of that 
system and to explore other means of pursuing justice. 
The natural and obvious alternative is to promote more extensive 
use of state courts.  Ordinarily, when Congress passes a law, the 
presumption is that it may be enforced in either federal or state 
court.150  And barring some extraordinarily good reason, under 
current Supreme Court case law, a state must open its courts to 
 
147 O’Scannlain, supra note 97, at 478–80.  This is a slightly narrower version of a 
proposal by Judge Newman to make all access to the federal courts in some specific types 
of cases within the discretion of the federal judges.  See Newman, supra note 82. 
148 The story of the Supreme Court provides precedent for creating such a system, 
which did not exist until 1925 when it became no longer practical for the Court to decide 
every case before it on the merits.  Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936 (1925).  And I posit 
that our system of deciding one case and then screening others of similar issues bears 
considerable similarities to the Court’s practice (however controversial) of granting, 
vacating, and remanding any number of cases previously held based upon a single 
precedential decision. 
149 See Sarat, supra note 21, at 329–35 (examining the perceived “hyperlexis” of the 
American people). 
150 This was the intent of the Framers, THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 35 
(Alexander Hamilton), and it has long been enforced by the Court, see Claflin v. 
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876); see also Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 
502, 507–08 (1962).  For an argument that this presumption should nonetheless be 
reversed because Congress all too often gives little consideration to jurisdictional 
allocation, see Martin H. Redish & John E. Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of 
Action in State Court, 76 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1976). 
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enforce those laws as interpreted by the federal courts.151  Yet still the 
preference of many attorneys and most academics would be to bring 
the suit in a federal court, which is commonly (but dubiously) 
presumed to be of higher quality.152  There has never been definitive 
proof that state courts are of materially inferior caliber to federal 
courts.  Indeed, the very lack of that evidence has caused some simply 
to throw up their hands and assert that litigants should be able to 
choose either forum or even both fora.153  For the reasons discussed 
above, we can no longer afford such luxury, assuming we ever could. 
Moreover, the very insistence that despite any concrete evidence 
establishing such a difference in quality, federal courts are 
nonetheless the preferable forum underlines what is truly behind this 
assessment—an assumption that the federal court is better because it 
is more likely to find in favor of the party asserting a federal right.154  
As officers of the court, both lawyers and judges should not make 
such a presumption that so blatantly assumes the side of one litigant 
and so greatly denigrates the courts of sovereign States, “[u]pon 
[whom], equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to 
guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the 
Constitution of the United States.”155 
Rather, if due to the inability to test the matter we must make a 
presumption, “the fitness and competency of [state] courts should be 
allowed in the utmost latitude.”156  Though there may be a few 
exceptions, states are usually both willing and able to apply federal 
 
151 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
152 I see this as the bigger implication of the statistic Professor Miller cites as evidence 
that the “litigation explosion” is overstated.  See Miller, supra note 19. 
153 Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal 
Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 256–57 (1988) (arguing that because trying to prove or 
disprove parity was a hopeless task, litigants should be allowed to choose their own 
forum); Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases 
Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1220–22 (2004) (noting 
that inconsistent jurisdictional rules spawn useless litigation and advocating a 
“multijurisdictional” approach). 
154 Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 725, 727 (1981) (describing with favor a definition of quality “based on an 
assumption that it is socially desirable to route controversies involving asserted 
constitutional rights of individuals to those judicial forums most likely to resolve them in 
favor of the individual”); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 153, at 257–58 (discussing 
such a definition with favor). 
155 Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1883). 
156 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 35, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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law that has been coherently announced.157  Instead when federal 
courts have disagreed with state courts on an issue of federal law, it 
has usually been based on either a difference of opinion regarding (1) 
the application of that law to a given set of facts or (2) the 
reconciliation of muddled federal law.158  However, for many of the 
reasons discussed above, retaining federal jurisdiction over the 
maximum number of cases is unlikely to ameliorate these problems, 
and quite likely to exacerbate them. 
In the first sort of situation, there is little more reason to think that 
the federal court will get it “right,” simply for want of sufficient time.  
For as I discussed above, at least at the appellate level, these sorts of 
cases are likely to be assigned to screening.  In my circuit, this means 
that it will be worked up by a staff attorney and batched together with 
dozens, if not hundreds, of cases and given minimal attention by three 
judges.  I somehow doubt that this is increasing the likelihood of 
getting the correct answer over assigning the case to the relevant state 
court. 
In the second situation, assigning the additional cases to the federal 
courts will only decrease the level of clarity.  Hamilton’s observation 
that “a voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences 
necessarily connected with the advantages of a free government,”159 
has proven ever more prescient as the country has grown more 
populous and more diverse.  I have a copy of the 1934 edition of the 
United States Code in my office; it occupies about six inches of shelf 
space.  Today’s code is in dozens of volumes and takes up an entire 
 
157 Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First 
Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 357–58 (2002); see also id. at 363 (“Contemporary 
evidence demonstrates that, for the most part, state courts are faithful agents of the 
Supreme Court in applying federal law.”).  I would like to point out that we as federal 
courts do not have the power to enforce our edicts at all.  As such, we rely on what one 
recent article termed the “culture of deference” to influence not only the state courts, 
Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 719 (2010), but also the federal Executive.  There have been times in the past when 
that culture has failed as to both, but only the state courts’ recalcitrance is still presumed. 
158 Measuring this effect precisely is difficult because federal and state courts rarely sit 
on the same case.  The most visible example is likely in the habeas context.  Here, as the 
recent record of my court thoroughly demonstrates, federal courts routinely disagree with 
states on how to apply federal law, but those state courts rarely make a decision that “was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or 
even that “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 
facts.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2) (2006); see O’Scannlain, supra note 91, at 1559–61 
(discussing the high rate of reversal of Ninth Circuit habeas decisions under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996). 
159 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 35, at 430 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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wall.  The Federal Reporter went into its third series less than ten 
years ago, and it already has almost seven hundred volumes.  Even 
accounting for the increased use of annotations, that is a lot of law to 
reconcile, and it is thus hardly shocking that the occasional state court 
comes to the wrong conclusion.  But that situation will only worsen 
by increasing the number of authoritative federal decisions.  So unless 
we are going to eliminate state courts’ ability to apply federal law—
something that would be nearly impossible unless the state courts 
were to go out of existence160—the best way to promote the ability of 
state courts to apply federal law properly is to promote more 
consistency in federal law. 
I take the stronger argument against shifting cases to the state 
courts to be that the state courts themselves are already overburdened.  
According to a recent study, there were over thirty million civil cases 
filed in American courts last year.161  The effects of those cases on 
the various state systems are troubling, but let’s take a closer look.  Of 
these approximately thirty million cases, only about four hundred 
thousand were filed in federal court.162  As such, shifting one hundred 
thousand cases from the federal courts would represent a twenty-five 
percent reduction in case load, but only increase the state court’s load 
by one-third of one percent.  And if the result would be more well-
reasoned and consistent explications of what federal law requires, this 
would likely reduce the state courts’ workload overall. 
This is not something that we as courts can or should do on our 
own.  Except in those instances when we create a private right of 
action where none had previously existed, we do not control our 
jurisdiction.  However, Congress could accomplish this goal through 
a number of relatively simple methods.  For example, it could 
reinstitute an amount in controversy requirement on general federal 
question jurisdiction, which existed until 1980.163  As Judge Posner 
has pointed out, such a floor has the same effect as increasing the 
“price” for access to the federal courts, without actually requiring 
 
160 After all, even today there are numerous state cases where issues of federal law are 
crucial to the outcome but which remain in state courts because they are not matters 
properly included in a well-pleaded complaint.  Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 
211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
161 REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS & DIRK OLIN, REBUILDING JUSTICE: CIVIL COURTS IN 
JEOPARDY AND WHY YOU SHOULD CARE (2011). 
162 See DUFF, supra note 76. 
163 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000  
. . . .”); see also Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub .L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980). 
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those seeking access to pay a higher fee.164  Such a rule would be a 
nondiscriminatory way to limit the number of cases in the federal 
courts, allowing federal courts to develop a more consistent body of 
federal law.  State courts, agencies, or arbitrators could then apply this 
more consistent body of law to the remaining cases. 
CONCLUSION 
“Access to Justice” is a multifaceted concept.  As a federal judge, I 
cannot but be flattered that so many today seem to equate it to access 
to the federal judiciary.  However, this notion is highly 
oversimplified.  Making it easier for someone to sue in a federal court 
does not automatically increase his or her ability to access justice for 
any number of reasons.  The simplest is that not everyone who feels 
himself or herself to be wronged is actually entitled to recover, and 
even if he or she is, “parties who need to rely on each other in the 
future are ill-served by a process that almost inevitably brands one 
‘right’ and the other ‘wrong.’”165  The more complex is that the 
federal courts simply do not have the capacity to take on such a 
burden.  The Framers of the Constitution did not draft for it, and the 
Congress has failed to provide for it.  As such, like it or not, the time 
has come to reexamine our assumptions about what it takes to 
promote access to justice within the federal courts. 
  
 
164 POSNER, supra note 58.  In the alternative, Congress could specify that any new 
regulations, particularly those relating to safety, do not create a federal cause of action.  
These statutes could then be used as evidence of negligence in state courts or, more likely, 
as the bases for administrative enforcement without creating new claims to be enforced in 
the federal courts.  Such specification is not technically necessary, but it would avoid 
unnecessary litigation as to whether or not the new regulation created a private right of 
action.  Of course, the better solution would likely be for Congress to eschew such 
regulation entirely in order to avoid raising the specter of federal preemption of state 
remedies.  See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble Federal 
Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007). 
165 Sarat, supra note 21, at 327 (discussing the driving force behind the tort reform 
movement and the move toward alternative dispute resolution). 
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